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In United States v. Nolan-Cooper,' a federal court of appeals af-
firmed the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss her indictment
based on a claim that the government's investigatory misconduct was
so egregious that it violated her due process rights? The alleged mis-
conduct was sex. From the outset of an undercover money laundering
investigation, the federal agent frequently wined and dined Ms.
Nolan-Cooper and took her dancing into the early morning hours.3
According to plan, he succeeded in developing a close relationship
with her that became romantic and culminated in sexual intercourse.4
Ms. Nolan-Cooper was arrested shortly thereafter.5 The court found
that the agent's actions were not sufficiently shocking, outrageous or
intolerable so as to offend her due process rights, and opined that
"the mere fact that an undercover operative establishes a level of in-
timacy with his or her target does not alone necessarily give rise to a
constitutional claim.'
6
The court fashioned and applied a three-part test to determine if
an agent's sexual relationship with his target constitutes outrageous
government conduct:7 (1) the government must consciously set out to
use sex as an investigatory weapon or acquiesce in such conduct once
' 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
2 See id. at 214.
3 See id. at 226.
4 See id. at 226-27.
5 See id. at 228.
6 Id. at 234.
7 The outrageous government conduct defense provides defendants with constitutional
protection from "certain egregious examples of government undercover work... violative of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Pre-
serving the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 305 (1996). See also
Dana M. Todd, In Defense of the Outrageous Government Defense in the Federal Courts, 84
Ky. W. 415, 427 (1995) (stating that the defense is based on the theory that government con-
duct can be so unreasonable and unfair that it violates the defendant's constitutional rights and
"may be supported by a showing either 1) that the defendant's right to due process has been
violated or 2) by appealing to the court's general supervisory powers to curtail the overreaching
of law enforcement officials").
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it knew or should have known it existed; (2) the agent must initiate
the sexual relationship or allow it to continue to achieve governmen-
tal ends; and (3) the sexual relationship must take place during or
close to the period covered by the indictment and be intertwined with
the events charged in the indictment.8 Applying this test to the facts of
the case, the court found that since the sexual relationship between
Ms. Nolan-Cooper and Agent Oubre arose out of their criminal busi-
ness relationship and because the indictment covered the time period
both before and after the two engaged in sexual intercourse, it could
not be disputed that the relationship and the events charged were in-
tertwined. 9 However, the court also accepted the district court's find-
ings that the sexual intercourse was not designed to further an investi-
gatory end,10 and concluded that the single instance of sexual miscon-
duct alone did not constitute a due process violation under the "ex-
tremely narrow confines of the outrageous government conduct doc-
trine."11
The court acknowledged that, under some circumstances, sexual
intercourse between a federal agent and his target may constitute out-
rageous government conduct. 12 The problem faced by the Nolan-
Cooper court and addressed by this Note is how to determine what
those circumstances are. Unlike other courts that have considered the
issue,13 the Nolan-Cooper court held that there does exist a discern-
able point in an agent-target relationship at which the agent's conduct
becomes outrageous conduct as a matter of constitutional law.' 4 The
court failed to articulate where this point was, but determined that a
romantic relationship lasting approximately a year and culminating in
sexual intercourse on only one occasion did not reach it.15
8 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221,232 (3d Cir. 1998).
9 See id. at 233.
'0 See id. at 234.
1 Id.
12 See id. at 231-33. The court cited United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1991) and United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), as two cases addressing the
issue of sexual or emotional intimacy in undercover operations. Both cases acknowledged that
the use of sex as an investigatory tool might "shock the conscience" and give rise to a due proc-
ess claim. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 566; Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1468.
13 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast to the Nolan-Cooper court, found no way to discern
between casual physical contact and "shocking" governmental behavior.
We see no principled way to identify a fixed point along the continuum from casual
physical contact to intense physical bonding beyond which the relationship becomes
"shocking'.... Rather, any attempt to distinguish between holding hands, hugging,
kissing, engaging in sexual foreplay, and having intercourse on a regular basis in or-
der to decide when an informant has "gone too far" would require us to draw upon
our peculiarly personal notions of human sexuality and social mores.
Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.
14 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 1998).
15 See id. at 232-34.
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The Nolan-Cooper court decided wrongly for several reasons.
Recognizing the defense of outrageous government conduct but set-
ting its standards impossibly high allows violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights without effective redress. Under the three-part
test, the defendant must prove both the agent's purpose and the gov-
ernment's knowledge of that purpose. Proving state of mind is always
difficult, if not impossible. The three-prong test was incorrectly for-
mulated and should be abandoned in favor of an absolute prohibition
of sexual intercourse between federal investigator and target. Under a
proper analysis, each of the first two prongs becomes superfluous,
leaving a strict liability standard so long as the sexual relationship
occurs during or close to the time of the indictment. Knowledge of the
use of sex as an investigative weapon should be imputed to the gov-
ernment through its agent. Otherwise, supervisors can too easily turn
a blind eye to the sexual escapades of their field agents. The useful-
ness and purpose of seduction as an investigation tool should be as-
sumed. Requiring the defendant to prove the agent had a subjective
intent to use the sexual relationship for government ends is overly
burdensome and irrelevant. The fact that sexual intercourse oc-
curred-regardless of who knew about it, why it happened or how
often it happened-should be the point on the continuum where the
courts find outrageous government conduct. The same reasoning
which requires the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence under the
Fourth Amendment supports dismissal of an indictment procured with
seduction and sexual intercourse: deterrence of improper conduct by
government officials, maintenance of judicial integrity, restoration of
the status quo, and support of the constitutional rights against self in-
crimination and illegal search and seizure.
The federal circuits are currently split on the issue of outrageous
government conduct;' 6 some courts recognize the defense while oth-
ers do not. The United States Supreme Court, at least in theory, rec-
ognizes the defense,' 7 but has never addressed the issue directly. In
application, however, even circuits that recognize the defense rarely
16 See Miller, supra note 7, at 306 ("[TIwo federal appellate courts have repudiated the
defense and created a significant split of authority among the lower courts.") (citing United
States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1424-
25 (6th Cir. 1994)).
17 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("Police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness
before it could bar conviction."); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (stating
that the Court "may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law en-
forcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction").
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find its rigorous requirements satisfied.' 8 Outrageous government
conduct should be recognized independent from the defense of en-
trapment, not dependent on the predisposition of the defendant or in-
ducement by the government. While certain forms of misconduct,
such as a sexual relationship, can be instrumental in inducing a de-
fendant to commit or continue to commit crimes he otherwise would
not commit, the focus of the outrageous government conduct inquiry
should be on whether the government's conduct was wrongful, not on
the defendant's state of mind.19 The remedy for outrageous govern-
ment conduct should be dismissal of the indictment. This Note in-
cludes a brief discussion of the development of and rationale behind
the defense of outrageous government conduct. While it is acknowl-
edged that even the existence of the defense is controversial, for the
purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that the outrageous govern-
ment conduct defense does and should exist. The real question that
remains is whether sexual intercourse between a federal agent and his
target should qualify as outrageous government conduct justifying
dismissal.
This Note calls for a change in existing law and for a new rule
that any sexual relationship between a government agent and the tar-
get of an investigation which advances to the point of sexual inter-
course is a per se violation of the target's due process rights.
20
I. BACKGROUND
The outrageous government conduct defense, first recognized in
1952, was initially widely accepted and then methodically limited
almost to the point of extinction.2 1 The outrageous government con-
18 For example, the last time the Third Circuit granted a defendant relief on outrageous
government conduct grounds was in 1978. See generally United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373
(3d Cir. 1978) (holding that extensive police involvement in the crime violated due process).
The last time the Ninth Circuit did so was in 1971. See generally Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the government was so intertwined with the criminal
activity that it was barred from prosecuting the defendant). Twigg and Greene were recently
cited as the only two federal cases in which the outrageous government conduct defense was
found to be applicable and its tenets satisfied. See United States v. Abbit, No. Crim. 98-208-HA,
1999 WL 1074073, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 29, 1999).
19 See United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that in evalu-
ating a due process outrageous government conduct defense, "the court looks only to the gov-
ernment's conduct objectively without regard to the defendant's criminal predisposition").
20 There is arguably a valid distinction between the conduct of federal agents and of paid
informants. This Note is only concerned with the former, although cases involving sexual rela-
tionships between informants and defendants are also appearing with greater frequency. See,
e.g., United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d
619 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987).
21 For example, the Sixth Circuit initially recognized the outrageous government conduct
defense and formulated a set of standards to be applied in such cases. See United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1980) (listing the four factors as: (1) the need for the
police conduct as shown by the type of criminal activity involved; (2) the impetus for the
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duct defense originated22 in the case of Rochin v. People of Califor-
nia.23 In that case, a sheriff and two deputies, having some informa-
tion that the defendant was selling narcotics, entered the open door of
his home without a warrant and forced open his bedroom door. After
observing the defendant swallow two capsules, they forcibly at-
tempted to extract them from his mouth. Failing to retrieve the cap-
sules, they arrested the defendant, took him handcuffed to a local
hospital and instructed a physician to force an emetic solution through
a tube into his stomach against his will. The stomach pumping in-
duced vomiting, and in the vomit two capsules containing traces of
morphine were found.24 The defendant was convicted and sentenced
to sixty days of imprisonment.25 The appellate court affirmed, despite
its findings that the officers "were guilty of unlawfully breaking into
and entering defendant's room and were guilty of unlawfully assault-
ing and battering defendant while in the room .... [and] were guilty
of unlawfully assaulting, battering, torturing and falsely imprisoning
the defendant at the alleged hospital. 26 The appropriate remedy, the
court held, was in an action for damages. 27 It also recommended an
examination of the qualifications of the officers and the physician.28
The Supreme Court overruled the appellate court on the basis that the
conviction was "obtained by methods that offended the Due Process
Clause., 29 The reasoning behind the Court's ruling was that the offi-
cers' actions "shocked the conscience" to such an extent that they
violated the Constitution. 0
scheme or whether the criminal enterprise preexisted the police involvement; (3) the control the
government exerted over the criminal enterprise; and (4) the impact of the police activity on the
commission of the crime). Later, however, the same circuit in United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d
1420 (6th Cir. 1994), stated that "there is no authority in this circuit which holds that the gov-
ernment's conduct in inducing the commission of a crime, if 'outrageous' enough, can bar
prosecution of an otherwise predisposed defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 1424 (emphasis in original); see also Miller, supra note 7, at 305-15 (dis-
cussing the background, development, and circuit split concerning the outrageous government
conduct defense).
2 See United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221,229 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("The notion that
misconduct by the government ... could give rise to a due process violation traces its modem
roots to Rochin v. California ... .
23 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
24 See id. at 166.
2 See id.
26 California v. Rochin, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
27 See id. at 3.
2 See id.
29 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
"0 See id. at 172-74. The Court explained that "[tihe proceedings by which this conviction
was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience .... They
are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Id.
at 172.
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Subsequent to Rochin, several courts reversed convictions on the
basis of overreaching by the government.31 These cases were decided
on the general principle that the government should not create crime
for the sake of bringing charges against persons persuaded to partici-
pate therein.3z The outrageous government conduct defense came to
be used primarily in cases of what the defendant considered to be ex-
treme entrapment.
33
However, the concept that the government's conduct in encour-
aging and facilitating a defendant to commit criminal acts could rise
to the level of a due process violation was put to rest in Hampton v.
United States.34 In Hampton, a government informant supplied the
defendant with what the defendant believed was a counterfeit drug
that would give the same reaction as heroin. The informant proposed
selling the drug to gullible acquaintances. The informant set up a sale
with federal agents. Defendant sold the counterfeit heroin procured
from the informant to the agents. The heroin was real and the defen-
dant was convicted of two counts of distribution. 35 The defendant ar-
gued that he was entrapped and, because the government acted as
both supplier and purchaser of the drug, his predisposition was irrele-
vant and he should be acquitted as a matter of law.36 Although the
court found the government played a significant role in enabling the
defendant to sell contraband, ' it held that the limitations of due proc-
ess only come into play when some protected right of the defendant is
violated.38 In Hampton, entrapment could be the defendant's only
possible defense with respect to the conduct of the government
31 See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing conviction on
fundamental fairness grounds); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing
conviction due to government having enmeshed itself in criminal activity).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) ("Congress could not have
intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a pro-
scribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government."); West, 511 F.2d at 1085
("[Wihen the government's own agent has set the accused up in illicit activity.., the role of the
government has passed the point of toleration.").
33 But see Miller, supra note 7, at 306 ("While [the defense] is invoked most frequently in
conjunction with the entrapment defense, the outrageous government conduct defense is not
limited to the entrapment context and may be invoked in any case that challenges the actions of
government officials.").
34 425 U.S. 484 (1976). See United States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788, 793 (4th Cir. 1989)
("[Any analysis of a due process argument based on the government's conduct in a reverse sting
operation begins with Hampton .... ); United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983)
(acknowledging the absence of a due process defense based on outrageous government conduct
as established in Hampton); United States v. LBS Bank-New York, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 496,499
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (referring to two Third Circuit decisions which found outrageous govern-
ment conduct and stating that "[tihose opinions are of little use in defining what qualifies as
'outrageous conduct', however, because the Supreme Court's decision in Hampton v. United
States calls into question the rationale upon which they were based") (citation omitted).
35 See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 485-87.
36 See id. at 487-88.
37 See id. at 489.
38 See id. at 490.
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agents.39 However, since he conceded his predisposition to commit
the crime, the defense of entrapment was unavailable to him, and he
was, in effect, without remedy.
United States v. Twigg4 is the most recent case in which the de-
fense of outrageous government conduct has been upheld. A govern-
ment informant, as part of his plea agreement, contacted Henry
Neville, a friend of twenty years, about setting up a methamphet-
amine laboratory. After several months of planning, Neville involved
Twigg, who owed a debt to Neville, in the operations. The informant
supplied the necessary equipment, raw materials and production site.
He was also in charge of production. The defendants' involvement
was generally limited to running errands and getting coffee.41 In re-
versing the convictions of illegal manufacture, the court made it clear
it was not relying on the defense of entrapment.4 2 Rather, the court
held that "the nature and extent of police involvement in this crime
was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a mat-
ter of due process of law.' 43 In so holding, the court acknowledged
that no Supreme Court decision had ever reversed a conviction on this
basis, but found the government misconduct to have gone "far beyond
the behavior found permissible in previous cases.
44
The court's rationale in Twigg has been called into question.
45
Twigg was based in part upon United States v. Russell,46 wherein the
Supreme Court stated that "we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outra-
geous that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.' 47 So
began a debate among federal circuit courts concerning the existence,
scope, and application of the defense of outrageous government con-
duct. The result of the debate is almost universally the same: "some
day" has not yet come.48 Virtually all courts ultimately reject the de-
fense of outrageous government conduct, but they do so on a variety
" See id.
40 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
41 See id. at 375-76.
42 See id. at 376 (noting that "[it should be made clear from the outset that our reversal is
not based on the entrapment defense").
41 Id. at 377.
44 id.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1425 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
"holding [in Twigg] has been disavowed by the Third Circuit on the ground that the Twigg court
improperly relied on United States v. West, which had been limited by Hampton and other, more
recent, Third Circuit opinions") (citations omitted).
4' 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
47 IdL at431-32.
4- See Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1425 (finding "unnecessary conflict in the courts of appeals
where, although the courts are all-but-unanimous in their results, contradictory standards have
evolved").
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of grounds: some by dismissing it as non-existent under the law;49
others by recognizing the defense, but only as an extension of the de-
fense of entrapment;' ° and still others by recognizing it in theory, but
never in fact.
In United States v. Tucker,52 the Sixth Circuit, after a lengthy
survey of the law, completely rejected the defense of outrageous gov-
ernment conduct.53 It interpreted all language supporting the defense
as pure dicta54 and determined the existence of the defense to be "an
open question" to be addressed by the court as a matter of first im-
pression.55 As in most other cases where the defense is raised, the un-
derlying government conduct in Tucker was inducement. The gov-
ernment operative, hired to catch abusers of the Tennessee food stamp
program and paid a commission on each sale, contacted an old friend
and claimed she was in dire financial need. Appearing at Ms.
Tucker's place of business "dressed in a manner suggesting her finan-
cial distress," the operative convinced the initially resisting defendant
and a co-worker to buy her foods stamps so that she would have
money to give her children a "proper Christmas. 56 The defendants
argued that the government's conduct in inducing them to commit the
crime of purchasing food stamps by playing on lifelong friendships
and human compassion was so outrageous that it violated their due
process rights.57
Holding that inducement does not violate a defendant's due proc-
ess rights, no matter how outrageous it is,58 the court dismissed out of
hand the defendants' theory of outrageous government conduct.59 In
so holding, the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion many other
courts have reached: that the defense of outrageous government con-
duct is nothing more than a glorified or exaggerated claim of entrap-
ment.60 As such, a defendant's willingness to commit the crime, char-
49 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
defense of outrageous government conduct "does not exist in this circuit").
50 See, e.g., United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 852 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that an
outrageous government conduct defense "is nothing more than a claim of entrapment"); Tucker,
28 F.3d at 1422 (stating that an analysis of any outrageous government conduct defense must
"begin with the law of entrapment").
51 See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[In the
twenty years since Twigg we have not found another set of facts that satisfy [the] rigorous re-
quirements" of the outrageous government conduct defense).
52 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
53 See id. at 1426-27 (determining that the Sixth Circuit was "not required to recognize the
'due process' defense" and concluding that it "simply does not exist").ffSee id. at 1424-25.
55 Id. at 1425.
-6 Id. at 1421.
S7 See id.
51 See id. at 1427.
59 See id. at 1428.
60 See id. at 1422 (finding that "[a]ny analysis of the so-called 'due process' defense must,
in our view, begin with the law of entrapment"). Other courts have reached the same conclusion.
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acter and reputation, prior criminal record, and any profit made in the
transaction can all render the defense unavailable.61
A. Distinguishing the Outrageous Government Conduct and
Entrapment Defenses62
It is easy to understand why many courts view the defense of
outrageous government conduct simply as an extension of the defense
of entrapment.63 This new defense was initially often raised on the
theory that, regardless of a defendant's predisposition to commit an
offense, dismissal is mandated whenever the court determines that
there has been "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in
the criminal enterprise." 64 The Supreme Court eventually rejected this
broadening of the entrapment defense in Russell.65 However, merely
because the Court declined to find outrageous government conduct
based on an enlarged entrapment defense in that case, it does not nec-
essarily follow that entrapment is the only basis on which such mis-
See, e.g., United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 852 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Tucker for the
proposition that an outrageous government conduct "claim is nothing more than a claim of
entrapment, and may not be circumvented by couching the defense in terms of due process");
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[A] successful due process defense
must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to
sustain an entrapment defense.").
6! As is explained below, any concession by the defendant of a criminal predisposition is
fatal to an entrapment claim. See infra notes 71-73, 81 and accompanying text. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has listed the factors used in determining whether a criminal defendant is predisposed as:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal record;
(2) whether the government initially made the suggestion of criminal activity;
(3) whether the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit;
(4) whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense that was over-
come by repeated government inducement or persuasion; and
(5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion supplied by the government.
United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This ap-
proach has been criticized as "a series of hunches based on circumstantial clues." Miller, supra
note 7, at 308.
62 For a detailed discussion of the two defenses, see generally John David Buretta, Recon-
figuring the Entrapment and Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945
(1996) (calling for an examination of the inconsistencies between the outrageous government
conduct and entrapment defenses in light of growing police power and to promote consistency
and fairness in their application).
63 Not all courts, however, view the defense in this way. See, e.g,, United States v. Miller,
891 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating the Supreme Court distinguished the concept of
outrageous government conduct from the defense of entrapment in United States v. Russell); see
also Miller, supra note 7, at 306 ("Unlike its statutory cousin, the outrageous government con-
duct defense focuses on the procedures used by law enforcement officials to obtain a conviction;
the defendant's mental state, the sole concern of the entrapment defense, is irrelevant to this
determination.") (footnote omitted).
6 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
65 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) ("The Court of Appeals was wrong, we believe, when it
sought to broaden the [entrapment defense].").
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conduct can be established. In fact, the Court specifically left the door
open for findings of outrageous government conduct in the future.66
The entrapment defense was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Sorrells v. United States.67 The focus of the majority opinion
was on the defendant's intent or predisposition to commit the of-
fense,68 while the concurrence looked to whether the government in-
stigated its commission. 69 The modem view of entrapment is based on
the former, subjective test and is available only to defendants who can
prove they would not have committed crimes absent governmental
inducement.70 Any concession by the defendant of a criminal predis-
position is fatal to her claim of entrapment. 7' However, in the area of
outrageous government conduct, requiring a preliminary showing of
entrapment unduly limits the availability of the defense. If the defense
of outrageous government conduct is considered only as an extension
of the defense of entrapment, it is unavailable to defendants who ad-
mit or who are proven to possess a predisposition to commit criminal
acts. This should not be the case, for clearly even the predisposed re-
tain their constitutional rights.72 Just as the predisposed defendant is
still protected against unlawful search and seizure and self-
incrimination, he should be protected against other forms of miscon-
duct by government officials.
73
Viewing the defense of outrageous government conduct as an
extension of entrapment, and therefore as a subjective test, relieves
courts of the duty to examine a federal agent's conduct. As the Sixth
Circuit said in Tucker, "[b]ecause we find no binding authority re-
quiring or even authorizing this court to conduct a purely objective
assessment.of the government's conduct in this case, we decline to do
66 See id. at 431-32 ("While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the instant case is
distinctly not of that breed."); see also Donald A. Dripps, At the Border of the Fourth Amend-
ment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct De-
fense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 262 (1993) (stating that the Court has left open the possibility
that demonstrably outrageous conduct might trigger a due process bar to conviction).
67 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6 See id. at 451.
69 See id. at 459.
70 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 436; see also United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1422 (6th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the Supreme Court made it "absolutely clear that a defendant, whose predisposition
to commit a particular crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, could not defend against
prosecution on the basis that the government induced him to commit that crime, no matter how
strong the inducement or 'outrageous' the government's conduct").
72 See California v. Rochin, 225 P.2d 913, 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) ("The requirements of
due process are just as applicable to the guilty as to the innocent.").
73 See Miller, supra note 7, at 328 (stating that the entrapment defense alone "offers
minimal protection to defendants because their prior crimes and even their general reputation
are admissible evidence in a determination of predisposition").
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so." 74 Once the defendant's predisposition is established, and the out-
rageous government conduct defense is thus unavailable, the court
can turn a blind eye to any reprehensible conduct on the part of the
government during the investigation.
In Hampton, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction by rejecting both an entrapment defense and a
due process defense." However, a majority of the Court, composed of
three dissenting Justices and two concurring Justices, rejected the po-
sition that "the defense of entrapment necessarily is the only doctrine
relevant to cases in which the Government has encouraged or other-
wise acted in concert with the defendant., 76 Thus, those circuits that
do not recognize the defense of outrageous government conduct inde-
pendent from the defense of entrapment are not following the law as
set forth by a majority of the Court.
Common sense dictates that the defense of outrageous govern-
ment conduct is not synonymous with the defense of entrapment.
Clearly, there exists a wide range of government activities that can be
outrageous, but are not protected by the theory of entrapment. For
example, threats of prosecution, coercion, bribery, threat or use of
force and torture are all prohibited as outrageous misconduct. 77 The
illegality of such conduct is not dependent on whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit a criminal act or even on whether she is
obviously guilty. As Justice Frankfurter stated in Sherman v. United
States,78 "[n]o matter what the defendant's past record and present
inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the
estimation of society, certain police conduct... is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society." 79
74 28 F.3d 1420, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994).
75 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,488-90 (1976).
76 Id. at 493 n.2 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. Nolan-Cooper,
155 F.3d 221, 229 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that, in Hampton, "[alIthough the plurality favored
aperse rule that, in cases of police overinvolvement in the suspect's criminal activity, there can
be no due process violation when the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime can be
shown, the concurring justices joined with a two-justice dissent to validate the outrageous con-
duct defense"); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding a clear
admonition by the Supreme Court that the due process defense and the entrapment defense are
"separate and distinct").
77 See generally L.L Reiser, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to
Criminal Prosecution, 40 A.LR.2d 908 (1955). Similarly, there are many forms of "troubling,
and potentially abusive, police methods" which are not covered by the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Dripps, supra note 66, at 263. The
outrageous government conduct defense acts as a gap-filler to protect defendants from miscon-
duct not specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
78 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
71 m at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The two defenses do tend to overlap,80 mainly because the gov-
ernment conduct most likely to be contested is that used to induce or
encourage a defendant to commit crimes or further crimes. Without a
separate outrageous government conduct defense based on due proc-
ess rights, when the government engages in misconduct in its investi-
gation but can prove the defendant was predisposed to commit at least
some part of the offense, the defendant is left without redress.
8 1
However, regardless of her predisposition, a defendant should be
entitled to the protection of the Constitution. Where the defense of
entrapment focuses on the state of mind of the defendant, the focus of
the defense of outrageous government conduct should be on the con-
duct of the government, viewed independently of the likelihood of the
defendant's predisposition or guilt.82 As the Second Circuit has stated,
"[t]he outrageousness of the government's conduct must be viewed
'standing alone' and without regard to the defendant's criminal dispo-
sition. ''83
It violates our system of justice to simply state that because a de-
fendant was clearly guilty, so it does not matter what techniques the
government used to obtain the evidence required for conviction. Yet,
this is essentially what courts are saying when they dismiss a claim of
outrageous government conduct because of what they view as over-
whelming evidence of guilt. In cases of technical violations (i.e., a
tardy wiretap warrant), it may be acceptable to overlook misconduct
so See Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 606 (stating that a difficulty in delineating the contours of the
due process defense "lies in a tendency for the due process defense to overlap with the entrap-
ment defense" ).
"1 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (ruling out the possibility
that "the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case
.. where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established"); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (holding that the defendant's "concession in the
Court of Appeals that the jury finding as to predisposition was supported by the evidence [was].
. . fatal to his claim of entrapment"); United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
1986) ("If the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, then the entrapment defense is
unavailable.").
8 In United States v. Dunn, 608 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), the court recognized this
difference and stated:
Unlike the defense of entrapment which primarily concerns an accused's predispo-
sition vel non to commit a particular offense, [the outrageous government conduct]
defense involves consideration of whether the conduct of law enforcement agents,
with respect to their initiation, encouragement of, and participation in a criminal
transaction or attempted transaction, "is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction."
Id. at 130 (citing Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32); see also Conrad F. Meis, United States v.
Tucker: The Illegitimate Death of the Outrageous Governmental Conduct Defense?, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 955, 960 (1995) ("Because a court focuses only on the government's conduct when con-
sidering an outrageous governmental conduct defense, a defendant who was predisposed to
commit the crime could plead outrageous governmental conduct.").
83 United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). See also
Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608 (stating it was proper for the district court to focus on the nature of the
government conduct in finding a due process violation).
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in light of strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. However, when
constitutional rights are violated, no level of guilt is sufficient to al-
low the judiciary to look the other way. Courts may refuse to convict
a defendant, "not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of
the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction
cannot be countenanced." 84 To hold otherwise is to overturn the basic
philosophy of our justice system.
As Justice Holmes stated in Olmstead v. United States, 5 "[w]e
have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some crimi-
nals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part."8
6
B. Theory v. Fact
Another way in which courts have effectively dismissed the out-
rageous government conduct defense is to recognize its existence, but
raise the bar sufficiently high enough that no defendant can satisfy
it.87 Thus, courts recognize the theory, but consistently find it inappli-
cable to the facts of the particular case.8 Typical of several courts, 9
the Seventh Circuit recognized the possibility of a finding of outra-
geous government conduct, distinct from the defense of entrapment,90
but declared that "government conduct must be truly outrageous be-
fore due process will prevent conviction of the defendant." Only a
single conviction has been overturned on outrageous government
conduct grounds in over twenty years.92 As one judge aptly put it, the
8 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'5 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
66 Id at470.
s In fact, one of the main criticisms of the outrageous government conduct defense is that
it is an "illusory remedy." See Miller, supra note 7, at 334; see also Dripps, supra note 66, at
265 ('Because no constitutional text informs the due process inquiry.. . judges are deeply
reluctant to invoke due process in actual cases .... ).
r' See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1424 (6th Cir. 1994) ("In more than
two dozen cases [since the defense of outrageous governmental conduct was first addressed],
this circuit has rejected 'on the facts' every attempt to invoke the so-called 'due process' de-
fense.") (citations omitted); see also Miller, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that the outrageous
government conduct defense "has a high threshold and has been successfully invoked in only
the most shocking cases of governmental misconduct").
89 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1271-73 (7th Cir.1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412,432 (1986); United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906,909 (10th Cir. 1992)).
90 See Miller, 891 F.2d at 1267.
91 Id. (quoting United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)).
92 See United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221,224 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In United States
v. Twigg, we sustained a defendant's claim that the government's investigatory misconduct was
so egregious that the due process clause demanded dismissal of the indictment against him...
though in the twenty years since Twigg we have not found another set of facts that satisfy its
rigorous requirements.") (citation omitted); Santana, 6 F.3d at 4 ("[S]ince the Supreme Court
decided Hampton, a federal appellate court has granted relief to a criminal defendant on the
basis of the outrageous misconduct defense only once.") (citing United States v. Twigg, 588
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"banner of outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom saluted
.... [I]n practice, courts have rejected its application with almost
monotonous regularity.,
93
Such stark resistance to the theory's application has led some to
call for its abandonment: "When push comes to shove, we should re-
ject the contention that the criminal must go free because the consta-
ble was too zealous. Why raise false hopes? Why waste litigants' and
judges' time searching for and rejecting on the facts defenses that
ought not exist as a matter of law?"94 However, regardless of the fre-
quency of its application or criticism of its existence, outrageous gov-
ernment conduct continues to be a recognized defense as a matter of
law.95 As such, until explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, it
should be made available to defendants in fact as well as in theory.
96
For the purpose of the remainder of this Note, it will be assumed that
outrageous government conduct is and should be valid grounds for
dismissal of an indictment distinct from the defense of entrapment.
11. ANALYSIS
A. United States v. Nolan-Cooper
In United States v. Nolan-Cooper,97 the defendant's predisposi-
tion to engage in money laundering was established,98 and, therefore,
F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the Eighth Circuit "has yet to see a case in which the government's conduct rose to
the level of such outrageousness"); United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1521 n.3 (10th Cir.
1994) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has "never issued an opinion overturning a criminal con-
viction on the ground of outrageous government conduct").
93 Santana, 6 F.3d at 4 (citations omitted). This practice is not inconsistent with what
some view as an obvious transition in the courts "from a due process-oriented criminal justice
model to a model that has placed increasing emphasis on crime control and crime prevention."
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrrT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992). The judiciary
has participated in relaxing due process protections and following an .'end[s] justifies the
means"' mentality. Id. at 394.
94 Miller, 891 F.2d at 1271 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
9' See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e have no reason to
doubt that the [United States Supreme] Court continues to recognize a due process claim prem-
ised upon outrageous law enforcement investigative techniques."); Santana, 6 F.3d at 3 n.4
(stating that although the appeal was rejected, two concurring Justices in Hampton formed a
majority "vivifying the doctrine of outrageous governmental conduct").
96 See Miller, supra note 7, at 346, 373 (stating that "courts have no right to deny a con-
stitutional protection to any defendant based on its perceived infrequent invocation," and those
courts "that have repudiated this defense have-therefore abdicated their constitutional responsi-
bility to protect the citizenry from arbitrary and extreme government action").
9 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
98 See id. at 226 (finding that Ms. Nolan-Cooper was willing to assist Agent Oubre at their
first meeting and that because she told him she was experienced in the art of money laundering,
"'[t]he evidence is overwhelming that Ms. Nolan-Cooper's criminal conduct in this case was
pervasive and entirely voluntary"') (citation omitted).
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she was barred from raising the defense of entrapment. 99 Instead, she
argued that the federal agent's sexual relationship with her during the
investigation was outrageous government conduct egregious enough
to entitle her to dismissal of the indictment.1l° The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the denial of her motion.' 0 '
The case began with an Internal Revenue Service investigation
of Angela Nolan-Cooper, a Philadelphia attorney suspected of laun-
dering drug money for clients. 102 Agent Oubre posed as "Louis Rich-
ard," a wealthy drug dealer from New Orleans, while Agent Jolly
posed as his bodyguard "Tony Jones.' ' 3 The investigation began in
February 1994 with an initial meeting between Agent Oubre and Ms.
Nolan-Cooper wherein she agreed to help him set up a sham business
and hide his money in Bahamian bank accounts. °4 The court de-
scribed the investigation that followed:
During the approximately thirteen-month undercover investi-
gation, Agent Oubre made several trips to the Philadelphia
area to meet with Nolan-Cooper. In order to maintain his
cover as a wealthy drug dealer, Oubre stayed in expensive
rooms at the city's best hotels, rented fancy cars, ate expen-
sive dinners, and consumed a considerable amount of alco-
hol. Moreover, during these visits Oubre initiated many so-
cial get-togethers with Nolan-Cooper, typically involving
dinner at pricey restaurants, drinks, and partying late into the
evening at area nightclubs. They were paid for by Oubre
(with funds supplied by the government) and often cost up-
wards of several hundred dollars per night. These social
events sometimes included other individuals (some of whom
were suspected co-conspirators), and sometimes involved
only Oubre and Nolan-Cooper, who apparently accepted Ou-
bre's invitations without much resistance.
Although not involving formal business discussions, Oubre
used these social meetings to develop and cement a relation-
ship with Nolan-Cooper. There is also testimony in the rec-
ord (though the district court did not make reference to these
facts in its opinion) that Oubre often bought Nolan-Cooper
small gifts, that he addressed her with affectionate pet names,
99 As explained above, a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime precludes the as-
sertion of an entrapment defense. See supra notes 61, 71-73 and accompanying text.
100 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 224.
101 See id. at 244.
102 See id. at 224.
'03 See id. at 225, 227.
104 See id. at 226.
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and that, on two occasions, he was seen being physically af-
fectionate with her.'0 5
Ms. Nolan-Cooper argued that Agent Oubre's cultivation of a
romantic relationship with her was an improper element of his inves-
tigative strategy.' °6 However, the conduct of Agent Oubre that di-
rectly gave rise to her motion to dismiss the indictment occurred on
February 17, 1995, just one month before her arrest. 0 7 On that date,
Agent Oubre planned another evening of dinner and nightclubbing.
He, Agent Jolly, Ms. Nolan-Cooper, and her friend Ms. Donita Nero
began the evening with drinks from the mini-bar of the agents' shared
hotel suite. They then had dinner at an expensive restaurant. 0 8 The
group separated for approximately three hours while the agents were
debriefed by their IRS supervisors. 10 9 After their debriefing, the
agents "happened upon" Ms. Nolan-Cooper and Ms. Nero at a local
bar the women had told the agents they were going to just before
closing time. 1 The four returned to the agents' suite and drank wine
into the early morning hours."' Agent Oubre and Ms. Nolan-Cooper
went into Agent Oubre's bedroom were they stayed for some time
and engaged in sexual intercourse. 12 Later that morning, Agent Jolly
went to Ms. Nero's home where the two also engaged in sexual inter-
course." 3 Ms. Nolan-Cooper was arrested March 24, 1995." 4 She
was sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, plus a fine and for-
feiture of funds."1
5
The court began its evaluation of the case with an overview of the
outrageous government conduct doctrine. Under the law of the Third
Circuit, "a criminal defendant may raise a due process challenge to an
indictment against her based on a claim that the government em-




However, the court noted that because of the "extraordinary" nature
of the doctrine, the judiciary has been "extremely hesitant" to uphold
l05 Id. at 226.
'0' See id. at 228.
107 See id. at 227. Ms. Nolan-Cooper did claim that she and Agent Oubre also had sex on
two prior occasions, in August and December of 1994. The trial court did not find these allega-
tions to be supported by fact and Ms. Nolan-Cooper did not revive them on appeal. See id. at
228 n.2.
108 See id. at 227.
109 See id.
110 Id.
11 See United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 957 F. Supp. 647, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1997), vacated,
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
112 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 227 (stating testimony indicated that the sexual contact
lasted from forty-five minutes to two hours).
11 See id.
114 See id. at 228.
"' See id. at 225.
116 Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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claims based on outrageous government conduct." 7 The court de-
clined to deal specifically with Ms. Nolan-Cooper's claims that Agent
Oubre's conduct violated her constitutional right to privacy." 8 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that "trying to fit a subjective notion such as
intimacy into the framework of the Due Process clause is an im-
mensely difficult task." 119 It held that there is a continuum between
casual physical contact and intense physical bonding,120 and at some
point "physical contact and emotional intimacy between an under-
cover agent and his or her target suspect becomes outrageous as a
matter of constitutional law."'121 In the court's estimation, however,
Agent Oubre had not reached that point. The court hinted at where
that point might be when it stated that "[h]ad the sexual misconduct
been present throughout the investigation (with the actual or con-
structive knowledge of supervisory personnel), a different situation
would be presented."'
122
The court reviewed United States v. Cuervelo,123 a similar case
wherein the agent admitted attempting to establish a "love interest"
between himself and his target but denied the defendant's claims that
he had had sexual relations with her on at least fifteen occasions 24
The Second Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
Ms. Gomez-Galvis's claim of outrageous government conduct.125 In
so doing, the court set forth a three-part test which, at minimum, the
defendant was required to satisfy in order to have her indictment dis-
missed:
(1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a
weapon in its investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such
conduct for its own purposes upon learning that such a rela-
tionship existed; (2) that the government agent initiated a
sexual relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to
achieve governmental ends; and (3) that the sexual relation-
ship took place during or close to the period covered by the
indictment and was entwined with the events charged
therein. 126
The court in Nolan-Cooper adopted this three-part test with one
minor adjustment. Believing that a requirement that the defendant
117 Id. at 230.
18 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d. at 235 n.10.
"' Id. at 232.
120 See id. at231.
121 Id. at 232.
'2 Id. at 224.
123 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991).
1'4 See id. at 561.
1' See id. at 569.
126 Id. at 567.
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prove the government had actual knowledge of the sexual relationship
might be too stringent and might encourage supervisory agents to
"turn a blind eye" to their operative's conduct, the court eliminated
it.127 Instead, a defendant alleging outrageous government conduct in
the Third Circuit "need only show that the government consciously
set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal, or acqui-
esced in such conduct for its own purposes once it knew or should
have known that such a relationship existed."1 28 Additionally, the
court emphasized that the test should not be applied rigidly. The ulti-
mate determination of the merits of an outrageous government con-
duct claim should continue to be whether the government's conduct
was so "'shocking, outrageous, and clearly intolerable"' that it of-
fends due process.
The Nolan-Cooper court erred in refusing to establish a bright
line rule prohibiting sexual intercourse between agent and target.
Sexual relations between a federal undercover agent and his target is
and should be considered by the courts to be sufficiently shocking,
outrageous, and clearly intolerable under our system of justice-
mandating the dismissal of the indictment. Instead of simply holding
that sexual intercourse between agent and target at any point in the
investigation and for any reason sufficiently "shocks the conscience"
to create a due process violation, the court adopted its three-part test.
As discussed below, the first two steps can and should be re-analyzed
and collapsed into a strict prohibition coupled with step three, which
is merely a timing requirement.
B. A Callfor the Abandonment of the Three-Part Test in Favor of a
Bright Line Rule
A bright line rule that the judiciary will not condone sexual rela-
tions between agent and target should replace the three-part test set
forth in Nolan-Cooper. As the law now stands, the government may
not purposefully, knowingly or recklessly 130 allow its agents to use
sex as an investigatory tool to achieve governmental ends during the
time period covered in the indictment or entwined with the events
therein. If the courts acknowledge that even recklessly allowing such
conduct to exist violates the defendant's due process rights, the courts
should go further and impose an absolute prohibition against it.
The first part of the test requires proof that the government con-
sciously set out to use sexual intercourse as a weapon in its investi-
gatory arsenal or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes
127 Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 233.
128 Id. (emphasis in original).
129 Id.
130 See id. (explaining that the defendant can prove that the government acquiesced in the
use of sexual conduct once it knew or should have known it existed).
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once it knew or should have known a sexual relationship existed. 3'
Thus, part one contains two components: knowledge and purpose.
The agent's knowledge concerning a sexual relationship should be
automatically imputed to the government, which is in a much better
position than the defendant to control what it knows about any given
investigation. The purposeful supervisory "blind eye" is not the only
situation to be feared if actual or constructive knowledge by the gov-
ernment must be proven. A simple "don't ask, don't tell" policy could
effectively eliminate every defendant's claim of a due process viola-
tion in cases like Nolan-Cooper. If the defendant cannot refute the
government's claim that its agent was so skilled in deception that
even his supervisors had no reason to know he was having sex with
his target, she will be denied relief. If it can be determined that the
conduct is wrongful, why should the agent be rewarded if he can suf-
ficiently cover his tracks?
Sexual intercourse does not happen accidentally. Federal agents
are presumably well-trained and intelligent people. The cultivation of
"love interests" or non-sexual romantic relationships by undercover
agents with targets is a bothersome, but not necessarily reprehensible,
tool used in the government's war on crime.132 Undercover agents
must, by the very nature of their work, use deception to obtain con-
victions.1 33 Every defendant who finds she has been duped by a
friend-turned-informant or an undercover agent whom she trusted will
feel the sting of embarrassment, humiliation and betrayal. However,
when the deceit leads not merely to friendship and intimacy, but to
sexual intercourse, the "sting" should "shock the conscience" and
automatically give rise to an enforceable outrageous government con-
duct defense. While "mere distaste" for certain investigative tech-
131 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132 See United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991) ('[S]leazy investi-
gatory tactics alone-unless so offensive that they amount to a violation of due process-do not
provide the 'clear basis in... law' required for the exercise of the supervisory power.") (cita-
tions omitted); United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T1he deceptive
creation and/or exploitation of an intimate relationship does not exceed the boundary of permis-
sible law enforcement tactics."); United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing "that government agents may lawfully use methods that may cause concern if
judged by abstract standards" but their conduct "becomes constitutionally unacceptable only
when it 'shocks the conscience') (citations omitted).
"' See Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466 ("To win a suspect's confidence, an informant must
make overtures of friendship and trust and must enjoy a great deal of freedom in deciding how
best to establish a rapport with the suspect."). But see Richard Lawrence Daniels, United States
v. Simpson: 'Outrageousness!' What Does it Really Mean-An Examination of the Outrageous
Conduct Defense, 18 Sw. U. L. REv. 105, 119 (1988) (arguing that since the underlying investi-
gation of non-sex crimes has nothing to do with sexual intercourse, "the use of sex as a tool does
not necessarily deserve similar treatment. While such trickery and deception on the part of the
government has been accepted by the court in certain circumstances, there still must be a limit to
what the government can do to deceive a defendant").
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niques is not sufficient to find they violate due process, 34 when a fed-
eral agent, acting with all the power and resources of the federal gov-
ernment behind him, has sexual intercourse under manifestly fraudu-
lent circumstances with the target of his investigation-the very per-
son whose goal it is for him to imprison-such techniques no longer
qualify as merely distasteful.
A defendant is not protected by the Due Process clause from
voluntarily reposing her trust in one who turns out to be unworthy of
it.135 Similarly, she is not protected from reposing her affections in
one who turns out to be feigning affections toward her. However,
when a relationship between agent and target proceeds to the point of
sexual intercourse, it does so on the foundation of a relationship used
as a weapon in the agent's investigatory arsenal. The carefully culti-
vated relationship, admittedly formed and cemented to be used as a
weapon, does not disappear into thin air on the occasion of sexual
intercourse. If the purpose of the intimate relationship is to aid the
investigation, and that intimate relationship leads to sexual inter-
course, it cannot logically be claimed that the purpose of the sexual
intercourse was not also to aid the investigation. r 6 If sexual inter-
course is a continuation of that relationship, its purpose should be as-
sumed. Thus, if (1) the knowledge of the government is considered to
be the same as the knowledge of the agent, and (2) the purpose of the
culmination of the tool (sexual intercourse) is assumed to be the same
as the purpose of the tool (a romantic/intimate relationship), the need
for part one of the test is eliminated. What the agent knows, the gov-
ernment should know. If the purpose of the relationship is to facilitate
the investigation, the climax of that relationship would presumably
"4 See Milton Hirsch, Confidential Informants: When Crime Pays, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
131, 154 (1984).
135 See, e.g., Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466 (explaining that the informant was sexually and
emotionally involved with defendant, yet denying the defendant's due process claim); Smith,
802 F.2d at 1125 (explaining that the informant was defendant's brother, with whom he was
attempting to establish a closer relationship, yet denying the defendant's due process claim).
1 6 The district court in Nolan-Cooper found that the sexual intercourse "was not designed
to further any investigatory end" because there was "no evidence of any discussions among the
investigating agents and their superiors concerning the use of sex as an inducement, reward or
lure to obtain Nolan-Cooper's participation in the conspiracy." 155 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir.
1998). The conclusion is faulty for two reasons. First, misconduct can be outrageous regardless
of whether or not it is used to induce the target to commit additional crimes. See supra Part II.A
(discussing entrapment and outrageous conduct defenses). Misconduct such as the unnecessary
use of threat or force, torture, illegal search and seizure, or unlawful arrest can violate a defen-
dant's due process rights regardless of whether it causes, encourages or rewards criminal activ-
ity during the investigation. Second, simply because the agents did not discuss the use of sex as
a tool does not mean it was not in fact used as a tool. If this were the case, simply by avoiding
discussing it beforehand, the officers in Rochin may have avoided violating the defendant's due
process rights when they unlawfully arrested him and forcibly induced vomiting. See supra
notes 23-30 and accompanyihg text. It is unlikely Agent Oubre discussed every element of his
plan to create an intimate relationship with Ms. Nolan-Cooper-such as calling her pet names
and being physically affectionate with her-with his partner or supervisors. Yet, it cannot le-
gitimately be argued that these techniques were not used as investigatory tools.
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facilitate the investigation all the more. 137 A sexual relationship
caused by the investigation-in the sense that but for the agent's un-
dercover pursuit of intimacy and trust, sexual intercourse would not
have occurred-should be assumed to be a tool of that investigation.
The second part of the test requires proof that the government
agent initiated a sexual relationship or allowed it to continue to
achieve governmental ends.138 The governmental ends requirement is
no different from the purpose requirement in part one. Presumably,
the ends sought by the government are the same as its purposes.
Those ends are the accumulation of sufficient evidence to secure con-
victions against the maximum number of criminals. A sexual relation-
ship which only enhances the intimacy and trust between an agent and
target (at least from the target's point of view) would clearly work
towards achieving those ends. 39 Thus, part two of the test should also
be eliminated.
Part three of the test requires that the sexual relationship take
place during or close to the period covered by the indictment and be
intertwined with the events charged.14 0 This requirement should be
retained since its proof will provide adequate evidence that the sexual
relationship would not have occurred but for the investigation and
that the sexual relationship was used as an investigatory tool.
In Nolan-Cooper, the appellate court accepted the district court's
finding that the sexual activity between Agent Oubre and Ms. Nolan-
Cooper was not designed to serve investigatory ends. 41 Rather, the
agents' actions were considered "'shaking loose' from the oversight
of their supervisors."' 42 Regardless of whether the specific act of sex-
ual intercourse was authorized by IRS supervisors or not, its occur-
rence was based on the cultivation of an intimate, romantic relation-
137 An additional problem with the knowledge and purpose requirements may arise in the
case of an agent who truly is pursuing a sexual relationship with his target merely for his own
gratification. Such conduct does not become less reprehensible simply because his superiors did
not know about it or because, in addition to securing a conviction, the agent secures sexual
relations with his personal "target." If the standard of a due process claim is truly to be gov-
ernment conduct which is "shocking, outrageous and clearly intolerable," the use by a govern-
ment agent of his position and government funds to satisfy his libido on false pretenses must
qualify as a violation of due process. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 232. For this reason the "detour
and frolic" doctrine, wherein an agent's conduct which takes him outside the scope of his em-
ployment is not imputed to his principal, should not bar a outrageous government conduct
claim. The misconduct does not become the less reprehensible, shocking or deserving of sanc-
tion if the agent does it "on his own time." An undercover agent, while acting under his investi-
gatory personae, who comes into contact with his target should not be considered to be acting
outside the scope of his employment.
133 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
139 Again, if the agent is allowing the sexual relationship to continue only for his own
ends-sexual gratification-the conduct should not be condoned. See supra note 137.
140 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
141 See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 234.
142 Id. at 228.
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ship over 13 months which the government not only condoned, but
financed.
Because Ms. Nolan-Cooper considered the romantic and sexual
relationship pursued by Agent Oubre to be "part of his investigative
strategy," she argued that the relationship "was an unjustifiable intru-
sion into the most personal aspects of her life in violation of her fun-
damental (due process and privacy) rights."' 43 The trial court, how-
ever, found no evidence "of discussions concerning the use of sex as
an inducement, reward or lure to obtain Nolan-Cooper's cooperation
in the illegal activity," and therefore rejected her claim that sexual
intercourse was used as an investigatory tool.' 44
Applying the three-part test to her case denied Ms. Nolan-
Cooper redress for the violation of her due process and privacy rights.
She could not prove the government had constructive or actual
knowledge of her sexual relationship with Agent Oubre. To the con-
trary, the trial court found that a series of calls in the late morning
hours of February 18, 1995, between Agents Oubre and Jolly was an
attempt to concoct a cover story to explain their failure to report dur-
ing the time they spent with Ms. Nolan-Cooper and Ms. Nero.145 It
defies logic that the government may reap the rewards of a romantic
relationship its agent cultivated with his target, and yet disavow
knowledge or approval of the culmination of that relationship.
The court found it significant that sexual relations between
Agent Oubre and Ms. Nolan-Cooper did not occur until near the end
of the investigation, "well after Oubre had gathered the necessary
evidence against Nolan-Cooper.' ' 146 This fact arguably makes it less
likely that sexual intercourse was used as an inducement for her to
commit or continue to commit crimes. However, as discussed above,
the defense of outrageous government conduct is not dependent on
inducement. 47 Rather, the focus should be an objective investigation
of Agent Oubre's conduct independent from its inducing effect on
Ms. Nolan-Cooper. The only remedy offered to Ms. Nolan-Cooper by
the court of appeals for Agent Oubre's "reprehensible' '148 conduct was
the statement that on remand the district court was not "categorically
precluded" from granting her a reduced sentence based upon the gov-
ernment's investigatory misconduct. 149 Essentially, the court found
the conduct reprehensible enough that it should reduce Ms. Nolan-
143 Id.
144 Id.
14- See id. at 227.
146 Id. at 233. This statement begs the question: if the evidence was already gathered, why
was the government continuing to finance Agents Oubre and Jolly's expensive evenings out?
147 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
141 United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 957 F, Supp. 647, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
149 United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221,225 (3d Cir. 1998).
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Cooper's jail time but not shocking enough to qualify as outrageous
government conduct.
The court's reasoning on this point creates a perverse incentive
for undercover agents to pursue an intimate relationship with a target
just short of sexual intercourse until all or most of the evidence is
gathered. Once the investigation is nearly complete, the agent is free
to engage in sexual intercourse with his target before she is arrested.
Because "[g]overnment agents are under no obligation to arrest a sus-
pect or halt their investigation as soon as they have the minimum evi-
dence necessary to establish probable cause,' 150 they have control
over how long this period before arrest will last.
If, instead of adopting and reshaping the Cuervelo three-part test,
the court had simply made a reasonable determination on the merits
as to whether Agent Oubre's conduct was so "shocking, outrageous,
and clearly intolerable 151 that due process was offended, its holding
should and would have been different. The court cited Twigg as an
example of governmental investigatory misconduct so egregious due
process demanded dismissal of the indictment. 152 In Twigg, the gov-
ernment informant provided equipment, raw materials, a production
site and the majority of the labor in the manufacture of methamphet-
amines for which the defendants were indicted. 153 Without denying
that such blatant overreaching as occurred in Twigg is a due process
violation, how Agent Oubre's "reprehensible" conduct in Nolan-
Cooper is more tolerable as a matter of constitutional law also defies,
if not logic, common notions of decency and fair play.154
Given society's current standards on the rights to privacy and
bodily integrity, sexual intercourse between a federal undercover
agent and the target of his investigation, under necessarily false pre-
tenses, should be viewed as per se "shocking, outrageous, and clearly
"0 United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v.
Leon, 460 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curium)).
'5' Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 230.
152 See id. at 224 (explaining that Twigg is the only time in that circuit that the facts met
the test).
153 United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Twigg,
see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
154 As commentators have noted, there are weaknesses in the outrageous government con-
duct defense. For example, "practices that might shock the judicial conscience in rural Idaho
might not cause judges in New York City to bat an eye." Miller, supra note 7, at 331. See also
Dripps, supra note 66, at 262 ("The shock-the-sense-of-justice approach is illegitimate and
unwise .... In theory the test is broad enough to condemn anything that judges do not like; in
practice it is so narrow that the Due Process Clause adds nothing to the limits on law enforce-
ment .... (citation omitted)). Further, Dripps posits that in the "post-Holocaustal age... [our]
'hardened sensibilities' are shocked by nothing." Id. at 271.
Though these arguments have merit, abandonment of the outrageous government con-
duct defense is not their necessary conclusion. Courts should simply lower the bar of what is
considered shocking. If searches and seizures must be reasonable, so should all other investiga-
tory conduct. If government conduct is not reasonable, it should shock the judicial conscience.
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intolerable." In fact, society's attitudes toward sexual bodily integrity
seem to be expanding to the point even of making such conduct
criminal. Tennessee, Alabama, and Kansas outlaw rape or other forms
of sexual misconduct by use of fraud, artifice or misrepresentation.
Several other states have enacted statutes defining classes of indi-
viduals who occupy positions of trust-for example, doctors or
clergy-and criminalizing sexual intercourse or contact with those to
whom they owe a duty-their patients or parishioners. Obtaining sex
through fraud is coming to be recognized as criminal in the same way
the courts have recognized obtaining sex through force is criminal.
Additionally, consent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation can
be viewed as non-consent in some circumstances. 155 "The outrage
upon the woman, and the injury to society is just as great" in cases
where consent is obtained by fraud as it is where actual force is em-
ployed. 56 Such conduct should not be tolerated by the executive
branch nor condoned by the judiciary.
C. Remedy
Several of the same reasons that justify the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure law justify dismissal of an indictment based on an
investigation wherein the federal agent establishes a sexual relation-
ship with his target. 57 Historically, five justifications have been of-
fered in support of the exclusionary rule. First, reading the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments in tandem, courts have held that forcible and com-
pulsory use of one's own testimony or private papers as evidence to
convict him is condemned as a type of forced self-incrimination.
58
Second, courts have reasoned that if illegally seized evidence can be
used in evidence against a defendant, "the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.' ' 159 Third, courts have
cited the maintenance of judicial integrity as support for the exclu-
sionary rule.' 60 Fourth, courts have supported the defense by pointing
SS See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 39, 46-
48 (1998) (reviewing case history of rape by fraud or coercion, relevant state statutes, and doc-
trines of force and non-consent).
l" Id. at 45 (noting, however, that the concept of rape by fraud is "a difficult and trouble-
some legal development"). But see People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975) ("Provided there is actual consent, the nature of the act being understood, it is not rape,
absent a statute, no matter how despicable the fraud .... ").
157 "Establishes" is not meant to connote initiation. Whether the agent-initiates or merely
allows a sexual relationship to continue should be irrelevant. It takes two to tango, and, as stated
above, sexual intercourse does not-absent bizarre fact scenarios beyond the scope of this
Note-happen by accident.
'-" See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
159 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393 (1914).
16o See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
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to deterrence of improper conduct by government officers. 1  Fifth,
courts have cited restoration of the status quo ante to justify applica-
tion of the rule.
162
If the government is permitted to use evidence obtained during
an investigation in which the target's due process and privacy rights
were violated, those rights may as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion. What meaning do guarantees of due process of law and privacy
have if the fruits of their violation can be used against a defendant in
a court of law? Similarly, if evidence obtained in such an investiga-
tion is admissible, federal agents will not be deterred from such mis-
conduct. Deterrence is often cited as the primary purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it. '1 63 The incentives for agents to engage in sexual relation-
ships with their targets must be removed. Dismissing indictments ob-
tained through the use of this improper tool is the most effective way
to do so. 164
Judicial integrity is threatened if the courts condone, by implica-
tion if not by explication, such "reprehensible" tactics. The judiciary
should aim to prevent crime, not promote it.165 As the Supreme Court
161 See id. at 217.
162 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). For an argument calling for the aban-
donment of all other justifications and the rethinking of the criteria for exclusion, see generally
Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 vAKE
FOREST L REv. 261,261 (1998).
163 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)
("[Tlhe [exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures"). But see Norton, supra note 162, at 262 ("Crafting measures to punish or deter unlaw-
ful conduct is not the business of the judiciary.").
'6 In his concurrence in Mapp v. Ohio, Justice Douglas discussed alternatives to the exclu-
sionary rule:
There are, of course, other theoretical remedies. One is disciplinary action within the
hierarchy of the police system, including prosecution of the police officer for a
crime. Yet as Mr. Justice Murphy said in Wolfv. Colorado .... "Self-scrutiny is a
lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to
prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered."
The only remaining remedy, if exclusion of evidence is not required, is an action of
trespass by the homeowner against the offending officer... The truth is that tres-
pass actions against officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are mainly
illusory remedies.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 670 (citations omitted). Similarly, our hopes may be too high if we expect
federal agents to prosecute themselves for sexual relationships with targets. An action against
the agent for assault, battery or rape is also likely to be an illusory remedy under the circum-
stances.
165 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 449 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("It is
the Government's duty to prevent crime, not to promote it."); see also Miller, supra note 7, at
309 (stating the entrapment defense "is a tool by which a court can 'preserve the purity of its
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has explained: "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example
.... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites an-
archy., 166 If the courts condone such violative conduct by federal
agents, our whole judicial system is sullied by deceptive, fraudulent
and clearly intolerable acts.
Finally, exclusion of evidence places both the government and
the defendant in the same position they would have been in had the
improper investigative techniques not been employed. Exclusion
"gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest
law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice."167 Similarly, dis-
missal of an indictment achieved through outrageous government
conduct deprives the government of the fruits of misconduct and
grants the defendant the constitutional protection to which she is enti-
tled. The exclusion of evidence alone is not sufficient where the mis-
conduct and the investigation are extensively intertwined. In addition,
as discussed above, if the agent waits until all the evidence is gathered
before engaging in sexual intercourse with his target, there is nothing
left to exclude. 68
The exclusionary rule has been, since its inception, controver-
sial. 169 Its most famous criticism came from Justice Cardozo, who
stated that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."'17 The same point was made at somewhat greater length
in the often quoted words of Professor Wigmore:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;
Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus
ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for con-
tempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not
punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius
to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and
incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our
way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the man
own temple' by refusing to 'permit [its] process to be used in aid of a scheme for the actual
creation of a crime by those whose duty is to deter its commission') (citing Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 454, 457 (1932)).
166 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
16s See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
169 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960).
170 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
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who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke some-
thing else.
171
Despite its controversial nature, the exclusionary rule has the
force of law and there are valid rationale supporting it. These ration-
ale support the dismissal of an indictment as a way to deter outra-
geous government conduct, and to preserve the rights of citizens and
the integrity of the courts. The choice is before us, and we must
choose the lesser of two evils. In cases of outrageous conduct, the
criminal should go free-not merely because the agent blundered-
but because to hold otherwise would give the force of law to errant
libidos, and condone reprehensible acts of deceit and violation. Jus-
tice Frankfurter aptly stated: "Public confidence in the fair and honor-
able administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule
of law, is the transcending value at stake."'
172
Because of its extreme nature, courts have recognized that the
"power to dismiss an indictment on due process grounds ... should
be exercised sparingly."'173 Sparing use does not, however, require "no
use."'174 In determining how to remedy a constitutional violation, the
court should "tailor the remedy to the injury."' 175 While the remedy for
due process violations is suppression of evidence under the exclu-
sionary rule, defendants in outrageous government conduct cases
seek-and if successful, are granted-dismissal of the indictment.
This is appropriate under the rationale that suppression is the correct
remedy where the evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's
rights can be identified and isolated. Where, however, the illegally
obtained evidence cannot be isolated from the agent's misconduct,
dismissal is the proper remedy: "In such a situation, it is simply im-
possible to excise the taint of the government's constitutional trans-
gressions from the prosecution of the defendant."'176 Where formation
of an intimate relationship with the target is an integral investigatory
tool and that relationship culminates in sexual intercourse, the entire
investigation is tainted and the agent should be denied the reward of
his target's conviction.
D. Pragmatic Concerns
It may be argued that the agent will not be deterred by dismissal
of the indictment because the case has become the responsibility of
171 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (citing 8 'VIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940)).
172 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17- United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
174 See id.
17- Id. at 1521 (citation omitted).
176 Id. at 1522.
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the prosecutor or simply because the agent does not care. If true, this
is certainly an unfortunate state of affairs for our criminal justice sys-
tem. If, however, the problem is that agents care too little for convic-
tions to be deterred by dismissal, the solution certainly is not to allow
the indictment and due process violations stand. Protection of judicial
integrity and the rights of citizens are, on their own, sufficient justifi-
cation for dismissal.
Additionally, it may be argued that practical implementation of
an absolute prohibition of sexual relationships between agent and tar-
get during or close to the period covered by the indictment will be too
difficult. Clearly, there will be evidentiary issues to be resolved and
hearings may at times seem little more than "he said, she said"
swearing contests as to whether or not sexual intercourse occurred.
There are several reasons why this argument is not persuasive. First,
as the law now stands, courts are required not only to determine
whether intercourse occurred or not, but also whether the government
knew or should have known about it and what its purpose was.
177
Second, ease of application is never, on its own, adequate justification
for an incorrect rule of law. Third, in forcible rape178 cases the same
difficult evidentiary issues exist and are properly confronted. That the
occurrence of misconduct is difficult to prove does not render it per-
missible or less deserving of our deterrent efforts.
IT. CONCLUSION
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation wrote in
1952:
One of the quickest ways for any law enforcement officer to
bring public disrepute upon himself, his organization and the
entire profession is to be found guilty of a violation of civil
rights. Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent
and performance, but, with unerring instinct, they know that
when any person is intentionally deprived of his constitu-
tional rights those responsible have committed no ordinary
offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by fail-
ure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to
totalitarianism.
177 See Miller, supra note 7, at 312 (noting that whether conduct "shocks the conscience"
and therefore becomes a due process violation is a question of law for the court, not a question
of fact for the jury). Hearings can be held in the same manner in which judges are accustomed to
holding suppression hearings.
17 I include all forms of non-statutory rape prohibited by law in this category, including
rape by force, threat of force, coercion, through the use of drugs or alcohol, etc.
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Civil rights violations are all the more regrettable because
they are so unnecessary ....
Complete protection of civil rights should be a primary con-
cern of every officer. These rights are basic in the law and
our obligation to uphold it leaves no room for any other
course of action.
179
Federal investigators should be held to the same high standards today.
As government agents, their conduct should be exemplary rather than
not "clearly intolerable." While subterfuge and artifice may be neces-
sary evils in the investigatory arsenal, the line can and should be
drawn at conduct so blatantly reprehensible and absolutely unneces-
sary.
Sexual intercourse between federal agent and target can serve no
valid purpose. The costs of sending a clear message that such viola-
tive conduct will not be countenanced--dismissing the indictment-
are outweighed by the far greater costs of allowing government
agents to violate a suspect's constitutional rights. If the government
agencies have been unsuccessful in their self-governance, the courts
must apply their most effective deterrent tool--dismissal.
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